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Abstract
We study some implications of the Theory of Rational Beliefs to mon-
etary policy. We show that monetary policy in a Rational Beliefs environ-
ment can have an important effect on the characteristics of economic fluc-
tuations. In Rational Beliefs Equilibria money is generically non-neutral
unlike Rational Expectations Equilibria in which money is neutral and
monetary policy is ineffective. Under Rational Beliefs Equilibria nominal
prices and real output change not only in response to changes in the ex-
ogenous growth rate of money but also in response to changes in the state
of beliefs. In Rational Beliefs Equilibria monetary shocks have real effects
even when they are observed but are not fully anticipated. Furthermore,
the non-neutrality of money results in a short run Phillips curve. When
money “flutters, real output sputters” [8]. We show that Endogenous Un-
certainty and the distribution of market beliefs are the major explanatory
variables of such fluctuations.
Under Rational Expectations monetary policy is ineffective because
agents neutralize it by predicting correctly the effect of the policy. Under
Rational Beliefs it is shown instead that inflation and recessions can be
substantially aggravated by the distribution of market beliefs.
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1 Introduction.
The work reported in this paper is a positive application of the Theory of Ratio-
nal Belief Equilibrium (in short RBE) to investigate and understand the nature
of money non-neutrality and its effects on the real economy. Given the expecta-
tional perspective proposed by the Theory of RBE, we show that one of the most
important role in the emerging of money non-neutrality is played by endogenous
uncertainty, the internally propagated uncertainty about endogenous variables
such as beliefs and actions of other agents and prices. We also show that the
heterogeneity of beliefs together with the distribution and intensity of agents’
states of optimism/pessimism can expand or reduce the real effect of monetary
policy and generate Endogenous Fluctuations of Output. This, in contrast to
the Rational Expectations results of money neutrality and policy ineffectiveness,
leads to a scenario in which monetary policy has an impact on the real economy
by affecting motives and decisions. This view is not new to economists. J.M.
Keynes already rejected the money neutrality presumption and wrote:
“...An economy, which uses money but uses it merely as a neutral link
between transactions in real things and real assets and does not allow
it to enter into motives or decisions, might be called - for want of a
better name - a real-exchange economy. The theory which I desiderate
would deal, in contradistinction to this, with an economy in which
money plays a part of its own and affects motives and decisions and
is, in short, one of the operative factors in the situation, so that the
course of events cannot be predicted, either in the long period or in
the short, without a knowledge of the behavior of money between the
first state and the last. And it is this which we ought to mean when
we speak of a monetary economy”. (J.M. Keynes [10] pp. 408, 409).
The New Classical Economics discarded this perspective and insisted on the
neutrality property of money. One can find early assertions of the neutrality
of money in writings regarding monetary issues several hundred years ago. Un-
till the late 1960’s the neutrality proposition was merely regarded as a general
principle following from the Quantity Theory of Money. No precise account of
the role of expectations was given to support such a proposition. With Lucas
[25] money neutrality began to be viewed as an “expectational” phenomenon.
Under Rational Expectations money is neutral because it is common knowledge
that all agents expect the equilibrium price function to exhibit neutrality. The
neutrality theory, developed by Lucas [25], Sargent and Wallace [36] often re-
ferred to as LSW proposition, states that any anticipated monetary shock would
have no effect on real economic variables neither in the short run nor in the long
run. Based on their theory of Rational Expectations, New Classical economists
believe in the idea of policy irrelevance. In other words, since individuals hold
Rational Expectations, they conclude that fully anticipated monetary policies
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are ineffective in the short run, as well as in the long run; only unanticipated
policy shocks can influence real variables in the short run while in the long run
the classical neutrality proposition holds. Empirical evidence has not supported
such a conclusion: Mishkin [29], using quarterly data for the United States for
the period 1954-1976, conclude that both anticipated and unanticipated mone-
tary policy have a long lasting effect on output. Similar conclusions on United
States and five additional countries are reached by Hoffman and Schlagenhauf [9].
Aware of the empirical evidence of money non-neutrality, early studies of mone-
tary policy under Rational Expectations Equilibrium (in short REE) focused on
informational imperfections. Lucas’ [25] argued that money is not neutral be-
cause, due to asymmetric information, people confuse changes in absolute price
level for changes in relative prices. Lucas’ [25] turned out to be one of the most
celebrated papers about monetary theory. It received widespread attention from
economists: it has been regarded as the flagship of the Rational Expectations
revolution. One of the main results that drew the attention of economists in
Lucas [25] has been the emergence of
“the Phillips curve not as an unexplained empirical fact, but as a
central feature of the solution to a general equilibrium system.”(Lucas
[25] p. 122)
However he also showed that the non zero slope of this curve has no use for policy
purposes. That is, monetary policy (of his k -percent type) is neutral in his model.
To strengthen this result he also claimed that the equilibrium allocation of his
model with a Friedman-like monetary policy is Pareto-optimal.
The Rational Expectations approach dominated almost all economic thought
in the 1970’s and early 1980’s. However, some concerns were raised: Chiappori
and Guesnerie [6] proves the existence of a new class of non-linear solutions to
the Lucas’ [25] model which exhibit the non-neutrality property. In fact, under
those solutions the labor-supply process is non-stationary and strongly affected
by the money stock. Concern about the validity of the LSW proposition has
also been raised by the theoretical sunspots literature. Azariadis [2], Azariadis
and Guesnerie [3], Cass and Shell [5] and others show that money can be non-
neutral in a wide class of models in which equilibrium depends on the realization
of such random variables as sunspots which have no inherent relevance to the
fundamentals of the economy. Some more concerns have as well been raised in a
recent paper by Woodford [37] who shows that money non-neutrality can emerge
as a simple consequence of the failure of common knowledge of monetary shocks
to hold at any level of the chain of reasoning. This shows even further how much
expectations are at the foundation of any theory of non-neutrality.
We note that when agents hold diverse beliefs the LSW neutrality proposition
need not to hold in equilibrium. An equilibrium in which rational agents hold
diverse beliefs is one where they have subjective theories about the dynamics of
the economy. In particular, in an RBE agents have a non-stationary perspective
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on the economy hence they hold different opinions about the true probability
distributions of the equilibrium stochastic process of exogenous and endogenous
variables (i.e. they hold different conditional probabilities). It follows agents
arrive at different conclusions when they condition their probability beliefs on
current information. That is, agents interpret current information differently.
Hence, even fully observed monetary shocks could be interpreted differently by
agents and money non-neutrality is implied (for earlier results see Motolese [30],
[31] and Kurz, Jin and Motolese [21]). Furthermore, the non-neutrality of money
under RBE results in the emergence of a short run Phillips curve. The non-zero
slope of this curve in the monetary equilibria with diverse beliefs, in spite of
Lucas’ [25] conclusion, opens up the door to a crucial role for monetary policy as
explained in Kurz, Jin and Motolese [21].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review
of Lucas’[25] model and results. Section 3 formalizes the OLG models at study,
defines both the REE and the RBE and reports and discusses the simulated
results of money neutrality/non-neutrality and the real effects of monetary policy
and state of beliefs. Section 4 examines the endogenous GNP fluctuations and
the Phillips curve results of our model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Review of Lucas Model.
Lucas’ [25] model of money neutrality was, for a time, very influential and con-
tributed to the development of the Rational Expectations literature on economic
policy. However, its empirical and theoretical relevance, as we mentioned above,
has been later subjected to strong criticism. We use it in the present paper, which
is methodological in nature, only insofar as it simplifies the analysis and allows a
better understanding of how a monetary RBE works. Nevertheless, as we explain
in Section 3, we depart from Lucas’ [25] model in three fundamental ways: (i)
trading occurs on one single competitive market thus we relax the assumption of
separate isolated markets; (ii) monetary policy is observed by all agents hence we
relax the Lucas’ [25] assumption of asymmetric information; (iii) agents’ do not
hold Rational Expectations but heterogeneous conditional Rational Beliefs. We
now turn to a brief review of Lucas’ [25] model.
The structure of the model is very simple. It is an Overlapping Generation
model where agents live for two periods. At each date t, N identical agents
are born and hence at each date 2N (divisible) agents are present in the econ-
omy. When young they make consumption and labor supply decisions over the
two periods of their life. They supply nt units of labor ( per capita) only when
young producing the amount yt = nt of consumption good. Since agents are only
productive in the first period of their life (when young) and the consumption
good is not storable, in order to consume in the second period of their life (when
old) they have to hold money. All agents have identical preferences and rational
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expectations in the sense of Muth [32]. Trading occurs on two competitive geo-
graphically isolated markets1 without any trading occurring between them and
without information exchange between them as well. At each date t the young
agents are allocated randomly across the two markets in the proportions θt/2 and
(1− θt/2), respectively, where {θt, t = 1, 2, ...} are independently and identically
distributed random variables with continuous symmetric density function g on
(0, 2). The old generation is allocated in such a way that each market possesses
at all times one-half the aggregate supply of money. The two markets are treated
symmetrically hence an equilibrium can be computed by looking at just one of
them.
Fiat money is issued by a government and is transferred to the old agents
at the beginning of each period. The transfer is assumed to be proportional to
the pre-transfer holdings of the agents. Let mt denote the pre-transfer money
holdings, per old agent, at date t. All agents know mt as well as the ruling price
pt on their own island and all past prices. Post transfer money holdings, per old
agent, are given by the equation
mt+1 = mtxt (1)
where {xt, t = 1, 2, ...} are independently and identically distributed random vari-
ables with continuous density function f on (0,∞). To rule out wealth redistri-
bution effect, it is assumed that xt is common to all old agents. The state of
the economy at any date t is then completely described by the three variables
(mt, xt, θt) and the motion from state to state is independent of decisions made by
agents and completely determined by equation (1), and by the density functions
g and f . There is no inheritance. Old agents do not have any labor to sell and
money does not yield any direct utility. At the start of trading at date t young
agents do not observe the monetary policy variable xt as well as the real shock
random variable θt. Since the observed price pt responds to both nominal and
real shocks, all the additional information about the actual state of the economy
hide in a noisy price message. Asymmetry of information is assumed as at the
beginning of trading at each date t all old agents possess more information than
young agents. In fact, by the mere fact of receiving a transfer of money propor-
tional to their pre-transfer holdings, they do observe xt. Some monetary policy xt
is implemented and yet it is not public information. Furthermore, such valuable
information for young agents is completely valueless to old agents who simply
give up their cash balances in return for as much consumption as they can buy
at market price.
The young agent’s utility, measured by a Von Neumann-Morgestern utility
1In the following literature this type of model has been explicitly referred to as the two-
island model (see Lucas [26]). In Azariadis [2] the two markets are named, in a very colorful
way, Pacifica and Atlantica
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function which has the form
U (ct, nt) + V (ct+1) (2)
depends on consumption ct, supply of labor nt at date t and consumption ct+1
at date t + 1. Let λt denote the young agent’s demand for money at date t,
which is the money holdings he is carrying over into next period and which will
then be affected by the monetary shock at date t + 1. Then his consumption
at date t + 1 will be ct+1 = (xt+1λt/pt+1). Let xt+1 and pt+1 have the joint
conditional distribution function F (xt+1,pt+1 | mt, pt), then the decision problem
of the young agent is to choose a non-negative triple (ct, nt, λt) to maximize his
expected utility function:
U (ct, nt) +
∫
V
(
xt+1λt
pt+1
)
dF (xt+1, pt+1 | mt, pt) (3)
subject to the budget constraint:
ptct ≤ ptnt − λt. (4)
In the market where the fraction θt/2 of young agents is allocated at date t,
if the state of the economy is (mt, xt, θt), the total demand for consumption good
by the old agents is (Nmtxt/2pt). Young agents choose their net good supply
functions (nt − ct) = ξ (pt;F (xt+1,pt+1 | mt, pt)). The total net good supply is
then Nθtξ( )/2 and the consumption good market will clear if
(Nmtxt/2pt) = Nθtξ (pt;F (xt+1,pt+1 | mt, pt)) /2, (5)
that is
mtxt/θt = ptξ (pt;F (xt+1,pt+1 | mt, pt)) . (6)
By Walras’ law, equilibrium on the money market is also obtained once the
market clearing condition (6) is satisfied. On the money market the total money
supplied by the old agents is (Nmtxt/2), hence the money supplied per demander
is (Nmtxt/2) / (Nθt/2) = mtxt/θt and in equilibrium λt = mtxt/θt.
The equilibrium price is a function, that is, a time invariant rule of the form
p = Ψ (m,x, θ) that relates the price level to the exogenous shocks (x, θ) and to
the pre-transfer money holdings m. The price function Ψ is known to all agents,
although they do not observe x and θ. The true probability distribution of next
period’s price, p′ = Ψ (m′, x′, θ′) = Ψ (mx, x′, θ′) is known, conditional on m,
from the known distribution of x, x′ and θ′. Agents, treating m as parameter,
take expectations with respect to the well-defined joint distribution of (x, x′, θ′)
conditional on Ψ (m,x, θ) denoted in Lucas’ paper by G (x, x′, θ′ | Ψ (m,x, θ)),
hence dispensed with unspecified distribution F . Returning to the exogenous
shocks (x, θ), from the form of the market clearing condition (6) and in view of
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Lemma 1 in Lucas ([25], p. 111), it is easy to see that they affect the economy
only through their ratio z = x/θ. Hence the market clearing price function
p = Ψ (m,x, θ) can be rewritten as p = Ψ (m, z). Under the a priori neutrality-like
hypothesis that the state variable m affects equilibrium prices in proportion and
quantities are not affected at all, the equilibrium price function is then rewritten
as p = Ψ (m,x, θ) = mϕ (z). Lucas [25] assumes that m and ϕ (z) are known to
the agents. He then proves that ϕ (z) is monotonic in z = x/θ (see Lemma 1 in
Lucas [25], p. 111)2. Hence if agents observe the price p they can deduce the
value of the ratio z = x/θ. If neither x nor θ are observed by agents, knowledge
of the ratio z = x/θ still leads to confusion between relative and absolute prices.
Indeed, under these conditions, money is non-neutral in Lucas’ model. On the
other hand, when either x or θ are observed by agents, price signals are not noisy
and consequently all nominal movements are only reflected in the absolute level
of prices. That is, money is neutral. In the case where the exogenous shock to the
economy is not a purely monetary one, Lucas finds a positive price function with
elasticity between zero and one. This implies that the equilibrium employment
function has the form n (x/θ) and that n
′
(x/θ) > 0. That is, increases in demand
induce increases in real output, weather the initial increase in demand is monetary
(an increase in x) or real ( a reduction in θ ). At this point the relevance to the
Phillips curve debate is clear. In Lucas’ model there is no usable trade-off between
inflation and employment and yet in equilibrium inflation and employment appear
to have positive correlation.
3 Money non-neutrality under Rational Beliefs.
3.1 The model and its stochastic structure.
We now consider the same monetary economy studied by Lucas [25] and compute
equilibria with the perspective of the theory of RBE and show how money non-
neutrality arises from the perspective of this theory. The economy is studied by
use of an Overlapping Generation model where agents live for two periods. At
each date t, N agents are born within each of the K agent-types present in the
economy and hence at each date 2NK agents (N young and N old for each one of
the K agent-types) are present in the economy. Generally within each agent-type
the N agents might have the same utility and hold different conditional beliefs.
This is the case of social states of beliefs studied in Kurz [18]. In the present
study we concentrate on the extreme case in which the beliefs of the agents are
perfectly correlated within each agent-type hence agents of the same type hold
2Following Lucas’ erratum [27] and relaxing the a priori neutrality-like hypothesis, Chiappori
and Guesnerie [6] found a broader class of non-neutral solutions to the price function p =
Ψ (m,x, θ) = ψ (m, z) with z = x/θ.
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the same conditional beliefs.3
We now turn to our monetary model of perfectly correlated beliefs within each
agent type. Note that this economy has the same results of an economy where
only 2K agents (K young and K old) are present. We then proceed as if only K
agents are born at each date t. To describe our model we first introduce some
notation.
lkt - consumption of leisure by the young agent k at t,
Ckt - consumption of commodities by the old agent k at t,
mkt - money holdings of the young agent k at t,
Pt - price of consumption good at date t,
Mt - money supply at date t,
gt - production of consumption good by the young agent k at t,
It - information available at t.
When young, agents make consumption and labor supply decisions over the
two period of their life. It is assumed as in Azariadis [2] that in the first period
of their life (when young) agents do not consume any consumption good. They
just supply (1− lt) units of labor (per capita) producing the amount gt = (1− lt)
of consumption good. We do not follow Lucas [25] in creating informationally
isolated markets. We assume that trading occurs on a single competitive market.
Young agents supply (1− lt) units of labor (per capita). At each date t an
exogenous shock θt impacts on young agents’productivity, where {θt, t = 1, 2, ...}
is a stationary Markov process that will be specified below. Hence, at each date
t each young agent produces the amount gt = θt (1− lt) of consumption good.
Since agents are only productive in the first periods of their life (when young)
and the consumption good is not storable, in order to consume in the second
period of their life (when old) they have to hold money.
Fiat money is issued by a government and is transferred to the old agents at
the beginning of each period. Let Mt−1 denote the aggregate pre-transfer money
holdings, that is the aggregate money purchased by the agents at t − 1 (when
young) and carried over next period at date t (when old). Then the aggregate
post-transfer money holdings at date t are given by the equation
Mt = Mt−1xt (7)
where {xt, t = 1, 2, ...} is a stationary Markov process that will be specified be-
low. The money increase/decrease ∆Mt = Mt −Mt−1 = Mt−1(xt − 1) is hence
transferred to the old agents. We adopt helicopter money as it is in Lucas [25],
hence the transfer is proportional to the pre-transfer holdings of the agents. Di-
verging from Lucas [25], no asymmetry of information is assumed in our model;
indeed we assume that, at date t, xt and θt are observed by all agents. This
3For a better understanding of the notation and terminology used here see chapter 3 in
Motolese [30] or Kurz [14].
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is equivalent to say that once the monetary policy at date t is announced it is
known to all agents. Under these assumptions in Lucas’ model with proportional
transfers money is neutral. This is not the case under Rational Beliefs where,
though agents observe xt and θt, money is generically non-neutral.
At all dates the aggregate stock of money, the total demand for consumption
by the old agents is Mt t = 1, 2, .... Young agents choose their net good supply
functions
gkt = θt
(
1− lkt
)
t = 1, 2, ...
The aggregate good supply is then
θt
(
K −
K∑
k=1
lkt
)
t = 1, 2, ...
Hence in equilibrium we shall have
Mt = Ptθt
(
K −
K∑
k=1
lkt
)
t = 1, 2, ... (8)
To make the equilibrium solutions independent of the initial money supply at
date 0, M0, define pt = Pt/Mt−1 and pt+1 = Pt+1/Mt which by equation (7)
can be written as pt+1 = Pt+1/Mt−1xt.4 This allows us to satisfy the stability
conditions in the sense of Kurz [12].
In equilibrium inflation rates for all transitions from t to t+ 1 are defined by
1 + it+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
t = 1, 2, ...
and using the definition, given above, of pt and equation (7) we redefine them by
1 + it+1 =
xtpt+1
pt
t = 1, 2, ... (9)
At each date t the young agents make an allocative decision with full knowl-
edge of their labor endowment, the price level, the real exogenous shock θt and the
observed monetary policy xt. However they are uncertain about the future price
level Pt+1 that will be realized when they are old. Therefore they are uncertain
about the future rate of return on their labor which is defined by
1 + rt+1 =
Ptxt+1
Pt+1
t = 1, 2, ...
and using the definition, given above, of pt and equation (7) it can be redefined
by
1 + rt+1 =
ptxt+1
xtpt+1
t = 1, 2, ... (10)
4To simplify notation in the rest of the section we call the ratios pt = Pt/Mt−1 prices.
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Note that the interest factor 1 + r can be also interpreted as a wage rate.
The stochastic structure of the model consists of: the process of money growth
{xt, t = 1, 2, ...} where xt ∈ X, the process of exogenous productivity shocks
{θt, t = 1, 2, ...} where θt ∈ Θ and of the process of the agents’ assessment vari-
ables denoted by yt =
(
y1t , y
2
t , ..., y
k
t
) ∈ Y ≡ Y 1 × Y 2 × ...× Y k. The state of the
economy at any date t is then entirely described by (xt, θt, yt).
Assumption 1 X is a finite subset in R++ with |X| elements; the exogenous
process {xt, t = 1, 2, ...} is a stable 5 Markov process on X with probability measure
ΠX defined on (X
∞,B (X∞)) with stationary measure mX .
Assumption 2 Θ is a finite subset in (0, 2) with |Θ| elements; the exogenous
process {θt, t = 1, 2, ...} is a stable Markov process on Θ with probability measure
ΠΘ defined on (Θ
∞,B (Θ∞)) with stationary measure mΘ.
Agents do not have structural knowledge and hence do not know the true
equilibrium map between states (xt, θt, yt) and prices. Agents take as known at
each date t the past observed prices (p1, p2, ..., pt), the past realizations of the
exogenous shocks {xτ , τ = 1, 2, ..., t} and {θτ , τ = 1, 2, ..., t} and they do observe
past realizations of {yτ , τ = 1, 2, ..., t} which occur within their own life. They do
not observe the assessment variables of any other agent or of their own “parents”.
For this reason they will never learn the true probability distribution of xt and
θt and the true structure of the equilibrium map. Agents then form probability
beliefs about prices and exogenous states knowing that the exogenous state space
is a partition of the price state space. We can then write the beliefs Qk as
probabilities on
(
P × Y k) and then state the following
Assumption 3 For all k, under the belief Qk the process
{(
pt, y
k
t
)
, t = 1, 2, ...
}
is jointly a Markov process and the dynamical system((
P × Y k)∞ ,B ((P × Y k)∞) , Qk, T)
(where T is the shift transformation) is stationary and ergodic. Y k is a finite
subset in R with
∣∣Y k∣∣ elements. The non-stationarity induced by each assessment
5Agents try to learn something about the true probability distribution Π by observing the
data generated by the economy. Let vt = (vt+1, vt+2, vt+3, . . .) ∈ V∞ and v = (v1, v2, v3, . . .) ∈
V∞ then the shift transformation is defined by vt = Tvt−1. Agents compute mn (B) (v) =
1
n
∑n−1
k=0 1B
(
T kv
)
, the relative frequency at which the dynamical system visits each measurable
set B ∈ B (V∞) given that it started at v, where 1B(z) =
{
1 if z ∈ B
0 if z /∈ B .
Learning occurs only if, given sufficient data, mn (B) (v) converges. It hence follows that a
dynamical system (V∞,B (V∞) ,Π, T ) is said to be stable if for all finite-dimensional sets, or
cylinders, B ∈ B (V∞), limn→∞mn(B)(v) = m(B)(v) Π a.e. The system is said to be strongly
stable if the limit of mn(B)(v) exists Π a.e. for all B ∈ B (V∞). If the additional assumption of
ergodicity is made (as we do later) then the limit above is independent of v. (For more details
see Kurz [12] and Kurz [14]).
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variable yk is a selection, at each date, of a Markov transition function (a matrix
if the set of prices is finite) which is determined by the value taken by ykt .
Further explanation of assumption 3 will be given later.
Assumption 4 The utility function of the kth agent is uk
(
lk, Ck
)
which is C2,
strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Using the definition, given above, of pt we now write the optimization problem
of the young agent k:
max
(lk,Ck)
EQkt
{
uk
(
lkt , C
k
t+1
) | (pt, xt,θt, ykt )} (11)
subject to
pt+1C
k
t+1 =
mkt xt+1
Mt
mkt = θt(1− lkt )ptMt−1
which imply that
Ckt+1 =
θt(1− lkt )ptxt+1
pt+1xt
. (12)
The market clearing conditions are:
xt = ptθt
(
K −
K∑
k=1
lkt
)
t = 1, 2, ... (13)
Under the Markov assumption, the demand function for leisure of all generations
take the form
lkt = ξ
k
(
pt, xt, θt, y
k
t
)
and in equilibrium
xt = ptθt
(
K −
K∑
k=1
ξk
(
pt, xt, θt, y
k
t
))
. (14)
We can solve (14) and write the equilibrium map in the form
pt = Φ
∗ (xt, θt, yt) t = 1, 2, ... (15)
Solution of the form (15) are also derived by Nielsen [33], Kurz and Schneider
[23], Kurz and Wu [24], Kurz and Beltratti [20], Kurz [16], [18] and by Kurz and
Motolese [22]. The state space for equilibrium analysis is (X ×Θ× Y ). Note that
the number of distinct equilibrium prices cannot exceed M = |Θ| |X|∏Kk=1 ∣∣Y k∣∣.
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We then conclude that in any RBE only a finite number of equilibrium prices
such that
ps = Φ
∗ (xs, θs, ys) for s = 1, 2, ...,M (16)
is observed.
Now we have to specify the true joint distribution of private assessment vari-
ables yt, xt and θt as a probability ΠXΘY on the measurable space
((X ×Θ× Y )∞ ,B ((X ×Θ× Y )∞)) .
Some restriction apply to the probability measure ΠXΘY . First consider the
vector yt of assessment variables. Each agent k determines his own probability
of ykt and knows his own distribution. The probability of y
k
t is Q
k
Y k
the marginal
measure of Qk on Y k. Given ΠXΘY the implied probability of y
k
t is Π(XΘY )Y k and
the following must be satisfied:
Π(XΘY )
Y k
= QkY k for k = 1, 2, ..., K. (17)
Assumption 5 Under ΠXΘY the process {(xt, θt, yt) , t = 1, 2, ...} is a Markov
process and the dynamical system
((X ×Θ× Y )∞ ,B ((X ×Θ× Y )∞) ,ΠXΘY , T )
is stable and ergodic with stationary measure mXΘY .
Lemma 6 The price process {pt, t = 1, 2, ...} is a stable and ergodic process on
the finite state space X × Θ × Y with probability ΠP and a stationary measure
mP . The probability ΠP on ((P ) ,B ((P )∞)) is defined by the probability ΠXΘY
together with the equilibrium map (16). The measure mP is also obtained from
mXΘY and the map Φ
∗ in (16).
Now, for any set A ∈ B ((X ×Θ)∞) define Φ∗XΘ (A) = {p ∈ (P )∞ : pt = Φ∗ (xt ,
θt,yt) all t, for (xt, θt) ∈ A, some yt ∈ Y ∞}. It then follows from the map (16)
that in equilibrium we must have
ΠXΘ (A) = ΠP (Φ
∗
XΘ (A)) for all A ∈ B ((X ×Θ)∞) (18)
and therefore
mXΘ (A) = mP (Φ
∗
XΘ (A)) for all A ∈ B ((X ×Θ)∞) . (19)
(16), (17), (18) and (19) provide the tools for stating the rationality conditions
of the agents.
The belief Qk is a probability on the space
((
P × Y k)∞ ,B ((P × Y k)∞))
since the agent is not assumed to know the map Φ∗. However, the data reveals
that the empirical distribution of prices, money growth and productivity shocks
must conform to (19) and this condition must be satisfied by Qk as required by
the rationality axioms. The following is then implied by the Conditional Stability
Theorem:
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Lemma 7 Under the assumptions of Lemma 6 Qk is a rational belief relative to
ΠP if:
1. Π(XΘY )
Y k
= Qk
Y k
,
2. QkXΘ (A) = Q
k
P (Φ
∗
XΘ (A)) = mXΘ (A) for all A ∈ B ((X ×Θ)∞),
3. QkP = mP .
Using Lemma 7 we can define a RBE as follows:
Definition 8
{
ΠP ,
{(
Qk, lks ,m
k
s
)
for k = 1, 2, ..., K and s = 1, 2, ...,M} and (ps)
for s = 1, 2, ...,M} constitute a RBE of the monetary OLG economy if:
1. Qk is a rational belief relative to ΠP for k = 1, 2, ..., K and ΠP is defined
by ΠXΘY and by the equilibrium map induced by
(
Q1, Q2, ..., Qk
)
,
2.
(
lk1 , l
k
2 , ..., l
k
M
)
are optimal agent allocations for k = 1, 2, ..., K,
3. xs = psθs
(
K −∑Kk=1 lk) for all t and s.
Theorem 9 Under assumptions 4 and 5 there exist a RBE.
Proof: See proof of existence from Kurz and Schneider [23] in Kurz [14] pp.
278-282.
3.2 Simulations of the monetary economy.
Our main tool of analysis here is economic simulations. Such tool enables us
to study dynamical systems which are complex mathematical objects for which
it would be very difficult to provide a complete characterization by using only
mathematical tools. The objective of all simulations is to exhibit the workings of
economic principles. For instance, the simulations in the present work focus on
the conditions under which the Markov monetary economy under study exhibits
money non-neutrality and endogenous fluctuations. We numerically solve for
equilibria and through MonteCarlo simulations we generate time series to study
the real effect of monetary policy.
Now, let K = 2. Assume a CRRA time separable utility function common to
all agents with common relative risk aversion (i.e. γ1 = γ2 = γ). The optimiza-
tion problem of agent k is then stated as follows for (k = 1, 2):
max
(lk,Ck)
EQkt
{
1
1− γ
(
lkt
)1−γ
+
β
1− γ
(
Ckt+1
)1−γ | It} (20)
13
subject to
Ckt+1 =
θt(1− lkt )ptxt+1
pt+1xt
. (21)
Inserting (21) into (20) we can write down agent-type 1’s first order conditions
for optimization:(
1− l1t
l1t
)γ
=
(
θtpt
xt
)1−γ
βEQ1
((
xt+1
pt+1
)1−γ
| It
)
(22)
and agent-type 2’s first order conditions for optimization:(
1− l2t
l2t
)γ
=
(
θtpt
xt
)1−γ
βEQ2
((
xt+1
pt+1
)1−γ
| It
)
. (23)
In equilibrium we must have
ptθt
(
2− l1t − l2t
)
= xt. (24)
Under assumptions 3 and 4 the standard theorems of dynamic programming
apply to the optimization of the agents. The demand function of agent-type k
(k = 1, 2) for leisure depends upon
(
pt, xt, θt, y
k
t
)
. We can then rewrite the market
clearing condition as
ptθt
(
2− l1t
(
pt, xt, θt, y
1
t
)− l2t (pt, xt, θt, y2t )) = xt. (25)
Condition (25) implies that the equilibrium map of the economy takes the
form:
pt = Φ
∗ (xt, θt, y1t , y2t ) . (26)
Assumption 10 Y 1 = Y 2 = {0, 1}, X = {xH , xL} and Θ = {θH , θL}. The
marginal measure of ΠXΘY on (X
∞,B (X∞)) and on (Θ∞,B (Θ∞)) specify these
processes to be stationary and ergodic Markov processes with transition matrices[
χ 1− χ
1− χ χ
]
and
[
ϑ 1− ϑ
1− ϑ ϑ
]
(27)
respectively. Similarly, the marginal measures of ΠXΘY on (Y
1∞,B (Y 1∞)) and
on (Y 2∞,B (Y 2∞)) specify these processes to be i.i.d. with the probability of y1t = 1
being α1 and the probability of y
2
t = 1 being α2.
The state space is (X ×Θ× Y 1 × Y 2) but we can consider this space to be
the index set S = {1, 2, . . . , 16}. We thus write down a new equilibrium map Φ
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between the indices of prices and the states of monetary policy, of productivity
shock and of assessment variables6:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

= Φ

x = xH θ = θH y1 = 1 y2 = 1
x = xH θ = θH y1 = 1 y2 = 0
x = xH θ = θH y1 = 0 y2 = 1
x = xH θ = θH y1 = 0 y2 = 0
x = xL θ = θH y1 = 1 y2 = 1
x = xL θ = θH y1 = 1 y2 = 0
x = xL θ = θH y1 = 0 y2 = 1
x = xL θ = θH y1 = 0 y2 = 0
x = xH θ = θL y1 = 1 y2 = 1
x = xH θ = θL y1 = 1 y2 = 0
x = xH θ = θL y1 = 0 y2 = 1
x = xH θ = θL y1 = 0 y2 = 0
x = xL θ = θL y1 = 1 y2 = 1
x = xL θ = θL y1 = 1 y2 = 0
x = xL θ = θL y1 = 0 y2 = 1
x = xL θ = θL y1 = 0 y2 = 0

. (28)
Given the map (28) we refer to states θH(θL) for s = 1, 2, ..., 8 (s = 9, 10, ..., 16)
as states of high (low) exogenous productivity shock. We refer to states xH
(
xL
)
for s = 1, ..., 4, 9, ..., 12 (s = 5, ..., 8, 13, ..., 16) as states of loose (tight) monetary
policy.
We proceed to construct the RBE by specifying the Markov transition matrix
representing the stationary measure as follows
Γ =

ϑχA ϑ(1−χ)A (1−ϑ)χA (1−ϑ)(1−χ)A
ϑ(1−χ)B ϑχB (1−ϑ)(1−χ)B (1−ϑ)χB
(1−ϑ)χC (1−ϑ)(1−χ)C ϑχC ϑ(1−χ)C
(1−ϑ)(1−χ)D (1−ϑ)χD ϑ(1−χ)D ϑχD
 (29)
which has pi = (pi1, ...., pi16) as its stationary distribution and where (A,B,C,D)
are all 4× 4 matrices characterized by the 18 parameters (α1, α2, a, b, c, d), where
a = (a1, a2, a3, a4), b = (b1, b2, b3, b4), c = (c1, c2, c3, c4), d = (d1, d2, d3, d4), and of
the following type:
A =

a1 α1 − a1 α2 − a1 1 + a1 − α1 − α2
a2 α1 − a2 α2 − a2 1 + a2 − α1 − α2
a3 α1 − a3 α2 − a3 1 + a3 − α1 − α2
a4 α1 − a4 α2 − a4 1 + a4 − α1 − α2
 . (30)
6Note that the map Φ is not the equilibrium map Φ∗ which defines the values prices take in
equilibrium but rather a map between the indices of the price states 1,2,...,16 and the vectors
of exogenous states and states of beliefs.
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From (29) and (30) it follows that the marginals of Γ are indeed as specified
in assumption 10. In fact, the marginal measures ΓY k specify y
k
t to be i.i.d.
with P
{
ykt = 1
}
= αk for k = 1, 2 and the marginal measures ΓX and ΓΘ are
specified by the stationary Markov processes (27). Also, although each process{
ykt , t = 1, 2, ...
}
for k = 1, 2 is very simple, the joint process may be complex
and allow joint correlation among the ykt over time.
3.2.1 Equilibrium conditions in terms of price states.
Given the price state space defined in (28) we can then write the system of Euler
equations, the budget constraints and the market clearing conditions in the form
used in the computations below (for s = 1, 2, ..., 16 , j = 1, 2, ..., 16 and k = 1, 2).
Equations (21)-(23) in terms of price states are respectively written as follows7:
cks,j =
θs(1− lks )psxj
pjxs
(31)
(
1− l1s
l1s
)γ
=
(
θsps
xs
)1−γ
β
16∑
j=1
(
xj
pj
)1−γ
Qs1(s,j) (32)
(
1− l2s
l2s
)γ
=
(
θsps
xs
)1−γ
β
16∑
j=1
(
xj
pj
)1−γ
Qs2(s,j) . (33)
And the market clearing conditions become:
psθs
(
2− l1s − l2s
)
= xs. (34)
We now turn to specify the probabilities Qs1 and Q
s
2 of the two agent-types to
complete the specification of the equilibria described by the system of equations
(31)-(34).
3.2.2 Rational beliefs.
By assumption 3 the beliefs of the agents are probabilities of joint Markov process
on prices and individual assessment variables. Since by assumption the marginals
on the assessment variables are i.i.d. with probabilities α1 and α2, if we denote
the two matrices for agent-type 1 by (F1, F2) and for agent-type 2 by (G1, G2), it
then follows that the rationality conditions of beliefs are:
α1F1 + (1− α1)F2 = Γ, α2G1 + (1− α2)G2 = Γ. (35)
7Note that to compute equilibrium solutions the system of equations (31)-(34) has been
solved using standard Newton method as supplied by the software package TENSOLVE, a suite
of FORTRAN 77 subroutines. For a complete overview of the software package TENSOLVE see
Bouaricha A. and Schnabel R. B. [4]. All computations have been implemented in FORTRAN
77 on DECStations Sun Ultra Enterprise 5000/200.
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Then the following probabilities (where F s,j1 is the (s, j) element of F1)
Qs1(s,j) =
{
F s,j1 if y
1
s = 1
F s,j2 if y
1
s = 0
Qs2(s,j)
{
Gs,j1 if y
2
s = 1
Gs,j2 if y
2
s = 0
(36)
define Qs1 and Q
s
2 in (32)-(33).
8 To complete the definition of Qs1(s,j) and Q
s
2(s,j)
in (36) it is left to specify matrices (F1, F2, G1, G2). Select 2 parameters λ and µ
which will be interpreted later, and define the row vectors of A with the notation
Aj = (aj, α1 − aj, α2 − aj, 1 + aj − (α1 + α2)) j = 1, 2, 3, 4. (37)
Similar notation is used for B, C and D. With this notation we define eight
matrix functions of a real number z as follows:
A1 (z) =

zA1
zA2
zA3
zA4
 , Aϑ2 (z) =

1− ϑz
1− ϑ A
1
1− ϑz
1− ϑ A
2
1− ϑz
1− ϑ A
3
1− ϑz
1− ϑ A
4

(38)
B1 (z) =

zB1
zB2
zB3
zB4
 , Bϑ2 (z) =

1− ϑz
1− ϑ B
1
1− ϑz
1− ϑ B
2
1− ϑz
1− ϑ B
3
1− ϑz
1− ϑ B
4

(39)
C1 (z) =

zC1
zC2
zC3
zC4
 , Cϑ2 (z) =

1− (1− ϑ) z
ϑ
C1
1− (1− ϑ) z
ϑ
C2
1− (1− ϑ) z
ϑ
C3
1− (1− ϑ) z
ϑ
C4

(40)
D1 (z) =

zD1
zD2
zD3
zD4
 , Dϑ2 (z) =

1− (1− ϑ) z
ϑ
D1
1− (1− ϑ) z
ϑ
D2
1− (1− ϑ) z
ϑ
D3
1− (1− ϑ) z
ϑ
D4

. (41)
8the superscript in Qs1 and Q
s
2 stress the dependence on y
1
s and y
2
s .
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Hence given the definitions (38)-(41) we define the matrices (F1 (λ) , F2 (λ)) by
F1 (λ) =

ϑχA1(λ) ϑ(1−χ)A1(λ) (1−ϑ)χAϑ2 (λ) (1−ϑ)(1−χ)Aϑ2 (λ)
ϑ(1−χ)B1(λ) ϑχB1(λ) (1−ϑ)(1−χ)Bϑ2 (λ) (1−ϑ)χBϑ2 (λ)
(1−ϑ)χC1(λ) (1−ϑ)(1−χ)C1(λ) ϑχCϑ2 (λ) ϑ(1−χ)Cϑ2 (λ)
(1−ϑ)(1−χ)D1(λ) (1−ϑ)χD1(λ) ϑ(1−χ)Dϑ2 (λ) ϑχDϑ2 (λ)

(42)
and F2 (λ) is then defined by the usual condition
F2 (λ) =
1
1− α1 (Γ− α1F1 (λ)) . (43)
Finally given the definitions (38)-(41) we define the matrices (G1 (µ) , G2 (µ)) by
G1 (µ) =

ϑχA1(µ) ϑ(1−χ)A1(µ) (1−ϑ)χAϑ2 (µ) (1−ϑ)(1−χ)Aϑ2 (µ)
ϑ(1−χ)B1(µ) ϑχB1(µ) (1−ϑ)(1−χ)Bϑ2 (µ) (1−ϑ)χBϑ2 (µ)
(1−ϑ)χC1(µ) (1−ϑ)(1−χ)C1(µ) ϑχCϑ2 (µ) ϑ(1−χ)Cϑ2 (µ)
(1−ϑ)(1−χ)D1(µ) (1−ϑ)χD1(µ) ϑ(1−χ)Dϑ2 (µ) ϑχDϑ2 (µ)

(44)
and G2 (µ) is then defined by the usual condition
G2 (µ) =
1
1− α2 (Γ− α2G1 (µ)) . (45)
Given the equilibrium map (28), the Markovian Rational Beliefs structure
constructed above allows any revision of the conditional probabilities of states of
high exogenous productivity shock (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8) relative to the stationary
measure Γ, to be offset by an opposite direction revision of the conditional proba-
bilities of states of low exogenous productivity shock (9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16).
In order to ensure non-negative probability entries in (F1, F2, G1, G2), the
selection of the parameters λ and µ is restricted by 10 inequality constraints
which define the feasible region. These constraints are as follows:
λ ≤ 1
ϑ
, λ ≤ 1
1− ϑ, λ ≤
1
α1
, λ ≥ α1 + ϑ− 1
ϑα1
, λ ≥ α1 − ϑ
(1− ϑ)α1 ,
µ ≤ 1
ϑ
, µ ≤ 1
1− ϑ, µ ≤
1
α2
, µ ≥ α2 + ϑ− 1
ϑα2
, µ ≥ α2 − ϑ
(1− ϑ)α2 .
(46)
To motivate these construction note that the parameters λ and µ are mul-
tiplied by the rows of A,B,C and D and hence are proportional changes of
the conditional probabilities of the four sets of four states (1, 2, 3, 4), (5, 6, 7, 8),
(9, 10, 11, 12) and (13, 14, 15, 16) relative to the stationary measure represented
by the matrix Γ in (29). Since λ and µ are the factors of proportionality by which
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agents’ conditional probability beliefs deviate from the stationary probabilities in
Γ, we refer to them as intensity parameters. So far agents’ assessment variables
have been used to endogenously enlarge the price state space and no actual eco-
nomic meaning has been attached to them. They attain meaning only when the
agents specify how they interpret these variables in generating their conditional
probability beliefs. For example, λ > 1 implies increased probabilities of states
(1, 2, 3, 4) and (5, 6, 7, 8) in F1 relative to Γ of agent-type 1 given an initial state
s and by the rationality conditions (35) the probabilities of the same states are
decreased in F2. This means that the assessment variables induce more optimism
or pessimism about the occurrence of prices (1, 2, 3, 4) and (5, 6, 7, 8) at t+ 1 rel-
ative to Γ. Suppose that at some date t state s = 1 occurs so that the price p1 is
realized. If λ > 1 then agent-type 1 with assessment variable y1t = 1 uses matrix
F1 to forecast prices at t + 1 and by (38)-(41) he is more optimistic (relative to
Γ) about the probabilities of (p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8) at t + 1. The converse
applies when y1t = 0. Suppose agent 1 is an optimist using F1. As λ > 1 increases
probabilities in F1, the rationality conditions (35) α1F1 +(1− α1)F2 = Γ require
a downward adjustment of the probabilities of (p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8) in the
pessimistic matrix F2.9
The simulations focus on the factors and the conditions under which the
Markov monetary economy at study exhibits endogenous uncertainty hence money
non-neutrality. There are two such factors:
1. Deviations over time of the intensity parameters (λ, µ) from 1 reflecting the
non-stationarity of beliefs of the agents.
2. Correlation among agents represented by the vectors (a, b, c, d) of parame-
ters inducing a joint distribution of the assessments which is Markov and
not i.i.d.
The results reported below are focused on studying the characteristics of the
joint effects of monetary policy and beliefs on inflation, labor supply and real
output.
For any transition of the economy from state s to state j the inflation rates
defined by (9) and the rates of return on labor defined by (10) are respectively
written as 1 + is,j =
xspj
ps
, 1 + rs,j =
xjps
pjxs
for all s, j = 1, 2, ..., 16 and respectively
9Many more complex different structures can be constructed and rational belief equilibria
studied. Different patterns of optimism/pessimism may be constructed. Motolese [30] shows
that in the case of a markov helicopter type monetary policy there is a particular belief structure
that when adopted by all agents it causes no endogenous uncertainty to be present and money
to be dynamically neutral. Such a structure implies a perfect correlation between states of
optimism/pessimism and monetary policy states. This beliefs structure would be justified if
agents learned from the data such a perfect correlation. In other words it would be justified
if the data told them that money is neutral. Which empirically is a questionable result. But
again, this conclusion is valid only when the monetary policy takes place through proportional
transfers.
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approximated by is,j ≈ ln(1 + is,j) and rs,j ≈ ln(1 + rs,j). Let us note that,
because the economy at study has a finite number of prices, the long term rate of
return on labor r both under REE and RBE is equal to zero and the long term
inflation rate i both under REE and RBE is equal to the long term growth rate
of money (EΓxt).
Before reporting the results of our simulations, we first note that in all states
s = 1, 2, ..., 16 nominal and real variables are jointly affected by the exogenous
monetary shocks xs ∈ X =
{
xH , xL
}
, the endogenous states of beliefs (y1s , y
2
s) ∈
Y ×Y = {(1, 1) , (1, 0) , (0, 1) , (0, 0)} and the exogenous productivity shocks θs ∈
Θ =
{
θH , θL
}
. Due to our Markov assumption any transition from θs = θ
L to
θj = θ
H for s, j = 1, 2, ..., 16 or viceversa represents a productivity regime switch.
When such a regime switch occurs prices and real variables are jointly affected by
the productivity shock, the monetary policy and the endogenous states of beliefs.
We want then to decompose the standard deviation of each variable under study
and subtract from it the effect of the productivity exogenous shocks in order
to isolate the compound effect of monetary forces and states of beliefs. In the
case of inflation rates, for example, we first compute the following two long term
conditional averages with fixed money supply (i.e. xs = 1 for s = 1, 2, ..., 16):
iHL = ln
(
EΓ
(
1 + is,j | θs = θH , θj = θL
))
and
iLH = ln
(
EΓ
(
1 + is,j | θs = θL, θj = θH
))
.
Now let $HLs,j = 1 when θs = θ
H , θj = θ
L and 0 otherwise, and let $LHs,j = 1 when
θs = θ
L, θj = θ
H and 0 otherwise. Hence the inflation rates volatility, which is the
solely joint effect of state of beliefs and monetary policy, will be defined by the
standard deviation of the following random variable (for all s, j = 1, 2, ..., 16.):
ιs,j = is,j − iHL$HLs,j − iLH$LHs,j . (47)
Similarly we compute the two long term conditional rates of return on labor
(rHL and rLH) and study the impact of states of beliefs and monetary policy on
expected real wage rates by the statistics of the following random variable (for
all s, j = 1, 2, ..., 16.):
ρs,j = is,j − rHL$HLs,j − rLH$LHs,j . (48)
We can now state the following:
Definition 11 Money is dynamically neutral if, for any transition of the econ-
omy from state s to state j (s, j = 1, 2, ..., 16) any monetary shock x ∈ X ={
xH , xL
}
leaves all real variables unaffected and leads to the following:
1 + ιs,j = xs for all s, j = 1, 2, ..., 16.
(i.e. within any given real exogenous shock regime the growth rate of money is
the sole determinant of the rate of inflation).
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To measure the pure effect of monetary policy and states of beliefs on output
fluctuations we also compute the output deviations from the conditional means
ΩH = EΓ(Ωs | θs = θH) and ΩL = EΓ(Ωs | θs = θL). This component is un-
correlated with the exogenous productivity shocks and represents the compound
effect of Endogenous Uncertainty and monetary policy. To measure this effect
let ζHs = 1 when θs = θ
H and 0 otherwise, and let ζLs = 1 when θs = θ
L and
0 otherwise. Now we can define the output deviations by the following random
variable (for all s = 1, 2, ..., 16.):
ωs = Ωs − ΩHζHs − ΩLζLs . (49)
3.3 Results of the simulations.
3.3.1 The parameterization.
Utility Function. In all simulations we assume that β = 0.92, the coefficients
of relative risk aversion are assumed to be γ = 3.5.
The Exogenous Stochastic Processes. In all simulations we set ϑ = 0.43 and
χ = 0.5. The exogenous productivity shock state space is set to be Θ ={
θH , θL
}
= {1.3, 0.7} and the money growth state space is set to be X ={
xH , xL
}
= {1.02, 0.98}.
The parameters above will remain unchanged across the different simulation
cases below unless explicitly specified.
The benchmark case: REE. We define the benchmark case when all agents
hold rational expectations. Note that the joint process {(xt, θt, y1t , y2t ) , t = 1, 2, ...}
allows correlation among the four variables over time and such correlation effect
plays a central role in the simulations. However, if we set α1 = α2 = 0.5 and
ai = bi = ci = di = 0.25 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 then all correlations among the
four variables of the joint process are eliminated. If, in addition, we assume
that agents ignore their assessment variables and set their beliefs by selecting
Q1(s,j) = Q2(s,j) = Γ(s,j) ∀s, j, then we have exactly the REE of Lucas [25].
In the benchmark case of rational expectations the intensity parameters are re-
quired to be λ = µ = 1. It is easy to see that in such case there is no endogenous
uncertainty and that in equilibrium only four possible values of prices, pΓHH ,
pΓLH , p
Γ
HL and p
Γ
LL, respectively associated with the exogenous states regimes{(
xHθH
)
,
(
xLθH
)
,
(
xHθL
)
,
(
xLθL
)}
, will be realized.
RBE. In all simulations we set α1 = α2 = 0.57. The vectors of correlation
parameters are set to a = b = c = d = (0.20, 0.14, 0.14, 0.14) while the intensity
parameters λs and µs for s = 1, 2, ..., 16 and will be accordingly specified later.
Note that we are not attempting to calibrate the model so to simulate the
behavior of any given country economy. We are only trying to show how money
non-neutrality arises in a RBE and how this differs from a REE. In the tables
21
below we report statistics on inflation rates (ι), rates of return on labor (ρ), level
of output (Ω) for the economy and output deviations from conditional means (ω).
Additionally we report expected aggregate output, inflation rate, wage rate and
output deviations conditional upon the occurrence of both a loose and a tight
monetary policy (i.e. respectively conditional upon xs = x
H and xs = x
L).
3.3.2 Characteristics of money neutrality in a REE.
Under any REE of the model money is neutral. The choice of the exogenous
monetary shock parameters
{
xH , xL
}
= {1.02, 0.98} imply the long term growth
rate of money (EΓxt) to be equal to zero. It follows that long run neutrality of
money is achieved under the REE and the RBE of the model. In other words
RBE are neutral on average. However, money is generically non-neutral in the
short run.
Table 1: Characteristics of money (non)-neutrality.
REE RBE (Case 1)
avg σ avg σ
ιt 0.0000 0.0200 0.0000 0.0503
ιt | xt = xH 0.0000 0.0200 0.0165 0.0344
ιt | xt = xL 0.0000 0.0200 -0.0169 0.0577
ρt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0529
ρt | xt = xH 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0167 0.0381
ρt | xt = xL 0.0000 0.0000 0.0167 0.0600
Ωt 1.0248 0.2623 1.0188 0.2699
Ωt | xt = xH 1.0248 0.2623 1.0334 0.2655
Ωt | xt = xL 1.0248 0.2623 1.0041 0.2735
ωt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0330
ωt | xt = xH 0.0000 0.0000 0.0147 0.0024
ωt | xt = xL 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0147 0.0417
We report in columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 the REE results which provide a
reference point for the study of the characteristics of inflation and non-neutrality
of money under RBE. From Table 1 one can see the well known result of money
neutrality under the Rational Expectations hypothesis. In fact, definition 11 is
satisfied: the average inflation rate is equal to the average growth rate of money
(i.e. zero), for all states s, j = 1, 2, ..., 16. 1 + ιs,j = xs and its standard deviation
exactly matches the one implied by the growth rate of money xs. All real vari-
ables in the economy are not correlated with monetary policy. Their conditional
expected values do not depend upon x ∈ {xH , xL}. In the REE any monetary
fluctuation leaves the real economy unaffected. In fact, the average level of output
is not responsive to monetary forces and exhibits a long term standard deviation
exclusively induced by the labor productivity shocks θt. The last conclusion we
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can draw from the Rational Expectations results is that monetary fluctuations,
due to the structural knowledge implied in such equilibrium, do not offer any
opportunity for positive returns on labor. In fact, the conditional expected rates
of return are equal to zero. Indeed, all the results reported in the REE columns
of Table 1 are well known and constitute the hallmark of money neutrality.
3.3.3 Characteristics of money non-neutrality in a RBE.
We now turn to the results obtained in the RBE simulations. Our main aim
is to explore if heterogeneous rational beliefs can expand(contract) the effect of
monetary policy causing endogenous fluctuations in output and employment and
affecting price volatility in contrast to the neutrality property of REE of Table 1.
To characterize the structure of beliefs we have to choose the intensity parameters
λ and µ. We thus start considering the following pattern of intensity parameters
which we name as Case 1 or xH-consensus :
λs = µs = 1.0000 for s = 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12
λs = µs = 1.7542 for s = 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16.
(50)
The results obtained under this pattern of beliefs are reported in the RBE
columns of Table 1. From that table we can immediately see that RBE are
drastically different than REE. Monetary forces are not neutral and have a non
trivial impact on the real sector of the economy as well as on inflation. Monetary
shocks have an effect on expectations of agents and although they observe the
current growth rate of money xt, their demand for money and their labor supply
(which depend upon their beliefs) change according to their interpretation of the
monetary signal. This results in a percentage change in the price level not equal
to the growth rate of money (i.e. money is dynamically non-neutral). Monetary
policy under RBE is perceived as a signal that carries information about future
price levels hence inflation rates and wage rates which is not the case under REE.
Before further discussing the results reported in Table 1 we need to get some
intuition about the pattern of intensity parameters in (50). Recall the equilibrium
map (28) in which the states xHs
(
xLs
)
for s = 1, ..., 4, 9, ..., 12 (s = 5, ..., 8, 13, ..., 16)
are states of loose (tight) monetary policy. Bear in mind that α1 = α2 = 0.57
means that both agents are optimistic in 57% of the dates and that λ = µ =
1.7542 is the maximal ratio, implied by the feasibility conditions (46), by which,
when optimistic, agents can adjust probabilities of states s = 1, . . . , 8 at t + 1
which are the states of low price and high output levels. On the other hand
λ = µ = 1 means that agents believe in the stationary measure Γ thus realizing
an overall consensus among them with no states of optimism or pessimism. Note
that the intensity parameters λs = µs = 1 from (50) are associated with states
of loose monetary policy (i.e. xt = x
H) while λs = µs = 1.7542 are associated
with states of tight monetary policy (i.e. xt = x
L). It follows that when xt = x
H
agents’ expectations are in accord with the stationary measure resulting in a
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perfect consensus. When xt = x
L states of disagreement among agents occur.
Notice that the parameter choice in (50) along with the choice of the correlation
parameters a = b = c = d = (0.20, 0.14, 0.14, 0.14) and α1 = α2 = 0.57 imply
that states of optimism and pessimism are asymmetric.
The implications of the xH-consensus structure are such that Ωt | xt = xH is
higher than Ωt | xt = xL. In fact when xt = xL agents’ expectations are pushed
to the extreme and with high probability they forecast less inflation and high
wage rates and so their labor supply is higher. However, the pessimists in the
economy are almost sure that high inflation and low wage rates will occur at date
t + 1 and work less and push down the total output Ωt | xt = xL. The intensity
level of pessimism dominates and hence aggravates the occurrence of crashes or
recession periods10. Monetary policy under Rational Beliefs does have an impact
on the real variables as it influences the terms of trade between the present and
the future. It is also the case under Rational Beliefs that the rational mistakes of
the agents can amplify or reduce the effect of monetary policy leading to a higher
standard deviation of inflation rates than under Rational Expectations. Also the
long term rates of return on labor under Rational Beliefs exhibit higher standard
deviations than under Rational Expectations.
We report in Figures 1 and 2 respectively samples of 300 observations of
equilibrium inflation rates (ι) and rates of return (ρ) generated by Montecarlo
simulations under the xH-consensus structure.
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Figure 1: Inflation Rates under Rational Beliefs (Case 1).
We now consider a pattern of rational beliefs which is symmetric in the choice
of intensity parameters to the one examined above and exhibits quite the opposite
behavior in the statistics. The following choice of beliefs parameters identifies
10The parameters choice and the interpretation of the implied dynamics is similar to that of
Kurz and Motolese [22] in explaining the equity premium and stock prices dynamics.
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Figure 2: Wage Rates under Rational Beliefs (Case 1).
Case 2 or xL-consensus :
λs = µs = 1.7542 for s = 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12
λs = µs = 1.0000 for s = 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16.
(51)
The results obtained under this pattern of beliefs are reported in Table 2.
Table 2: Characteristics of money non-neutrality.
RBE (Case 2)
avg σ
ιt 0.0000 0.0622
ιt | xt = xH -0.0169 0.0683
ιt | xt = xL 0.0165 0.0502
ρt 0.0000 0.0529
ρt | xt = xH 0.0167 0.0600
ρt | xt = xL -0.0167 0.0381
Ωt 1.0188 0.2699
Ωt | xt = xH 1.0041 0.2735
Ωt | xt = xL 1.0334 0.2655
ωt 0.0000 0.0330
ωt | xt = xH -0.0147 0.0417
ωt | xt = xL 0.0147 0.0024
From Table 2 we can immediately notice the reversed behavior in the reported
statistics of the xL-consensus belief structure with respect to that of Case 1. In
fact, conditional on a loose monetary policy the expected rate of inflation is below
average as well as the expected output while the wage rate is above average. The
contrary occurs when conditioning on a tight monetary policy. Also notice that,
despite the symmetry in the choice of the intensity parameters λ and µ, due to the
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asymmetric dynamics of states of optimism and pessimism, under this pattern
of rational beliefs the joint effect of monetary policy and agents’ expectations
induces a higher volatility in inflation rates. We report in Figure 3 a sample of 300
observations of equilibrium inflation rates (ι) under the xL-consensus structure.
50 100 150 200 250 300
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Time
Inf
lati
on
 Ra
tes
Figure 3: Inflation Rates under Rational Beliefs (Case 2).
Why is money non neutral under RBE? The real effect of money in an
RBE arises from the diversity of beliefs. Monetary shocks have a real effect
because agents interpret differently the observed growth rate of money at date
t thus inducing diverse forecasts of all variables in the economy at date t + 1.
Agents disagree about the effects of monetary shocks on future inflation, wage
rates and output levels. Agent hold diverse forecast of the real variables in the
economy and once they disagree on the effects of monetary shocks on future
inflation, monetary shocks have real effects. This is analogous to Lucas’ [25]
case justifying money non-neutrality by agents confusion between monetary and
real shocks. However, in an RBE there is no confusion about shocks and all the
observables, only diversity of opinions about forecasting future variables and this
is sufficient for money to be non neutral. In agreement with the results achieved
by Kurz, Jin and Motolese [21] we also assert that once agents perceive money
to have real effects, it is rational for them to incorporate monetary shocks as a
component affecting their own beliefs about all variables in the economy (i.e. for
xt to affect agents’ perceptions).
In Tables 1 and 2 we have reported results from two different Rational Beliefs
structures. Both of them exhibit money non-neutrality but its behavior goes
in two opposite directions. The difference between Table 1 and Table 2 is the
quantitative impact of the monetary shock xt: the effect of xH in Table 1 is equal
to the effect of xL in Table 2 and vice versa. The first structure (x
H-consensus)
presents a pro-cyclical behavior: it shows positive correlation between the growth
rate of money and output. The second structure xL-consensus, instead, presents
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a counter-cyclical behavior: it shows negative correlation between the growth
rate of money and output11.
The empirical evidence is compatible with the pro-cyclical rational belief
structure, that is, we observe a positive correlation between the growth rate
of money and output (see the highly debated issue outlined by Friedman and
Schwartz [7] and recently reestablished by Aksoy and Piskorski [1]). Analogous
modeling and results have been studied by Kurz, Jin and Motolese [21].
The above conclusion leads to the natural question of whether the structure
of beliefs under Case 1 is the actual pattern of beliefs observed in the market.
We can not give an answer yet. Further research and availability of market data
on expectations is crucial to address this issue. Within the RBE theory a recent
paper by Kurz [19] started tackling such a topic following earlier issues raised by
Romer and Romer [35].
4 Real GNP fluctuations and the Phillips Curve.
Tables 1 and 2 show a very important feature of the RBE under study: some
components of real GNP fluctuations in the economy are explained by an endoge-
nous mechanism induced by the distribution of beliefs among agents. Further-
more, GNP fluctuations under the two monetary regimes xH and xL are different
thus implying an effective role for monetary policy in the settling of cycles. This
is a drastically different scenario compared to the one obtained under Rational
Expectations where the monetary forces play no role at all to explain GNP fluc-
tuations and cycles. The distribution of beliefs in the economy at any date is a
crucial factor which constitutes an endogenous components of output fluctuations.
This is one of the most important conclusions we can draw from the results shown
above. To support the argument above we have also reported in Tables 1 and 2
statistics for output deviations from the conditional means (ω) within each mon-
etary regime. This component is uncorrelated with the exogenous productivity
shocks and represents the compound effect of Endogenous Uncertainty and mon-
etary policy. In figure 4, a time series realization of 300 observations of output
deviations is plotted. From figure 4 we can immediately see that in a RBE the
distribution of beliefs creates Endogenous Fluctuations of Output which are not
generated under REE. Such fluctuations take the form of crashes and booms or
of recession and expansion periods. From Figure 4 as well as from Tables 1 and 2
we notice that negative deviations (crashes) have larger standard deviations then
positive deviations (booms). In other words they are not symmetric. Once again
this is due to the asymmetric behavior of states of optimism and pessimism as
explained above. The intensity of the pessimists dominates and it is just coun-
terbalanced by a less intense level of optimism and this pushes the level of output
11The sign of such a correlation under both cases is also respectively confirmed by the re-
gression coefficients of the growth rate of money xt in the Phillips curves (52) and (53).
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Figure 4: Endogenous Output fluctuations under Rational Beliefs.
down to recession. We thus conclude that under Rational Beliefs recessions can
be substantially aggravated by the distribution of market beliefs.
To strengthen the RBE result of money non-neutrality we also simulated the
economy and generated 10,000 observations and estimated the following basic
and simple regression model:
Ωt = δ0 + δ1Et,Γ|pt (ιt+1) + δ2xt + δ3θt + t.
where Et,Γ|pt (ιt+1) is the t+ 1 expected inflation rate conditional upon the state
price pt observed at t measured by the stationary probability Γ. We obtained the
following estimation for the RBE Case 1 :
Ωt = 0.0940
(0.0050)
+ 0.8399
(0.0026)
Et,Γ|pt (ιt+1)+0.0319
(0.0050)
xt+0.8930
(0.0003)
θt+t, R
2 = 0.999, (52)
and the following estimation for the RBE Case 2 :
Ωt = 0.1556
(0.0049)
+ 0.8358
(0.0026)
Et,Γ|pt (ιt+1)−0.0296
(0.0049)
xt+0.8931
(0.0003)
θt+t, R
2 = 0.999. (53)
In both regressions the Phillips curve coefficient of Et,Γ|pt (ιt+1) is positive. In the
regression of Case 1 the sign of the coefficient of the growth rate of money xt
is also positive which stresses the positive correlation between monetary regimes
and GNP we already highlighted in Table 1. On the contrary in the regression
of Case 2 the sign of the coefficient of the growth rate of money xt is negative as
expected given the negative correlation between monetary regimes and GNP we
already found in Table 2.
We thus conclude that the non-zero slope of the Phillips Curves above is due
to the endogenous distribution of beliefs in the economy. Furthermore, such a
result is consistent with those of Kurz, Jin and Motolese [21] where also further
implications of the role of monetary policy under RBE are discussed.
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5 Conclusions.
In this paper we have demonstrated that dynamic money non-neutrality is a
generic property of any RBE. Endogenous uncertainty is the main force generat-
ing money non-neutrality. Endogenous uncertainty is the dominant uncertainty
in an RBE. Such a form of uncertainty is that component of market volatility
which is generated by the diversity of agent’s beliefs. Hence monetary forces do
have an impact on the real variables of the economy and such an impact can
be amplified or reversed by the beliefs of the agents. We studied a two-agent
OLG economy similar to the two islands model of Lucas’ [25]. We assumed all
transaction occur on one single market and no informational asymmetry exists.
We showed that the heterogeneity of beliefs together with the distribution and
intensity of agents’ states of optimism/pessimism can expand or reduce the real
effect of monetary policy and generate Endogenous Fluctuations of Output and
give rise to higher volatility of inflation rates and wage rates.
We found that under RBE, when agents perceive monetary policy as a signal
that carries information about future prices and wage rates, different patterns
of volatility are observed in the economy. Such patterns depend upon agents’
subjective interpretation of the observed monetary signal and upon the induced
optimism/pessimism in their conditional probability beliefs. Furthermore, the
non-neutrality of money results in a short run Phillips curve and its non-zero
slope is due to the endogenous distribution of beliefs in the economy.
It is clear that the proposed paradigm of the Theory of Rational Beliefs has
very important implications to the study of economic fluctuations and to the
formulation of monetary policy. For this reason we think that the distribution of
market beliefs constitutes useful information for the conduct of monetary policy.
The results obtained in the present study and Nielsen [34] represent a first step
in addressing the implications of the theory proposed by Kurz [12], [13] to mon-
etary policy. Further implications have already been addressed by Kurz, Jin and
Motolese [21] who show under an infinite horizon RBE money non-neutrality, the
existence of a short-run Phillips curve and of “hump shaped” impulse response
functions with respect to monetary shocks. They also address the very debated
issue about the role of monetary policy which under RBE is aimed to reducing
the excess endogenously created volatility.
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